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Florida Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1952], Art. 9
CASE COMMENTS

In the Dean Milk case the Court held that a state cannot erect
an economic barrier protecting a local industry from out-of-state
competition, even in the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people, unless there are no reasonable
alternatives. The Court reasoned in the instant case that the clause
as to alternatives did not apply to the problem at hand because interstate commerce itself "knocks on the local door," and only by regulating that knock can the interest of the home be protected. Virtual
prohibition, however, is not the only means of regulating door-todoor merchandising. A more equitable solution would be to have
householders post "no soliciting" notices and provide that trespass
in violation of the signs be punishable as a misdemeanor.1 6 This solution would come nearer to giving each group, local merchants,
householders, and direct sellers, the protection to which it is entitled.
ARcar
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STATE TAXATION FOR POLICE
PROTECTION OF OCEAN PIER
Carnasion v. Paul, 53 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1951)

Appellants contested the authority of the coastal county of Volusia to levy and collect a tax upon a steel and concrete pier extending from the mainland to a point well beyond the low water mark
of the Atlantic Ocean. Basing their case upon United States v. California,' they contended that it had in practical effect shifted the
ownership dominion of the tidelands to the Federal Government exclusively. The lower court held the pier subject to county taxation and
dismissed the bill. On appeal, HELD, the county has authority to
exercise "police control" over the area and can accordingly tax it in
return, so long as the action taken does not contravene the paramount
authority of the United States.

loSee Jensen, supra note 8, at 280.
1332 U.S. 19 (1947).
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Numerous comments2 have been written on the probable import
of the Tidelands decision, but to date only two cases involving similar circumstances have been litigated. 3 In the Tidelands decision the
Court utilized the ambiguous phraseology, ".

.

. the Federal Govern-

ment rather than the state has paramount rights in and power over
that belt, an incident to which is full dominion over the resources of
the soil under that water area, including oil"; 4 and this concept was

followed substantially in United States v. Texas and United States
v. Louisiana.5 It has been suggested 6 that the Court in the Tidelands
case has created an entirely new concept of property ownership advanced in circumventing what were assumed to be well established
legal principles. Prior to the Tidelands decision it was apparently
settled that if land on the coast be reclaimed from the sea, or if piers
or wharves be extended into the sea, such land and structures are
a part of the territory of the state whose shores they adjoin. 7 Each
state was said to own the beds of all tidewaters within its jurisdiction,
unless they had been granted away., The appellant pier-owners in
the instant case were of the opinion that the Tidelands decision overruled these and other related property law principles, but such an
inference cannot with any certainty be drawn from the context of the
case when carefully analyzed.
In the Tidelands decision the Court subordinated the question
of ownership of bare legal title to the fact that the controverted areas
were, of necessity, subject to federal control and paramount right
because of its function as a national sovereignty and for purposes of
national defense. These bases are subject to severe criticism, par2
E.g., Parker, Problems in Florida and Other Coastal States Caused by the
California Tidelands Decision, I U. or FLA. L. REv. 44 (1948); Sullivan, The Tidelands Question, 3 Wyo. L.J. 10 (1948); Note, 8 LA. L. REv. 578 (1948); 26 TEXAS
L. REv. 304 (1948); 36 VA. L. REv. 806 (1950); 5 WASH. & Laa L. REv. 85 (1948).
aUnited States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339
U.S. 699 (1950).
4332 U.S. at 38.
5

See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 712 (1950); United States v. Louisiana,

339 U.S. 699, 704 (1950).
6Sullivan, supra note 2, at 10.
7Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 18 Wall. 57 (U.S. 1873); Pollard v. Hagan,

3 How. 212 (U.S. 1845); Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 451 (1857);
Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
RIWeber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 18 Wall. 57 (U.S. 1873); Mumford v.

Wardell, 6 Wall. 423 (U.S. 1867); Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71 (U.S. 1855).
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ticularly in view of the federal powers in time of war and by eminent
domain, as well as the constant cooperation of the states individually
in past emergencies; but it nevertheless clearly emphasizes the doubt
that existed in the minds of the justices regarding the existence of
title in the Federal Government to the fee in the controverted area.
It should also be noted that the Government alleged in its original
action against California, and likewise in the Texas and Louisiana
tidelands cases, that it was the "owner in fee simple" of the tidelands. 9
The reluctance of the United States Supreme Court to meet this issue
squarely gives further proof of the existence of that doubt.
The Florida Supreme Court's holding in the instant case can be
further substantiated by the manner adopted in the Tidelands decision of distinguishing The Abby Dodge-o and Skiriotes v. Florida."
In The Abby Dodge, the Court held that a federal statute regulating
the landing of sponges at ports of the United States related to only
those sponges taken outside Florida territory, thus narrowing the
scope of the statute and impliedly admitting that limits to the exercise of federal power do exist. In the Skiriotes case a Florida statute,
in the absence of conflicting federal legislation, was held constitutional as applied to sponge fisheries within the territorial waters of
Florida. Appellant was charged with using the forbidden apparatus
approximately two marine leagues from the mean low water mark
on the west shore of Florida. The Florida Supreme Court held that
this western boundary was fixed by the Florida Constitution at three
marine leagues from the shore;12 and that this was the same boundary
defined by the Constitution of 1868, to which Congress had by statute
referred in admitting Florida to representation.13 The Tidelands
Court distinguished the Abby Dodge case on the basis that it pertained to the state's right to regulate and conserve, and not to its
right to use and deplete resources of national and international importance.14 In recognizing the Skiriotes case, the Court stated that
the statute, so far as applied to conduct within the territorial waters

9See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 22 (1947); United States v. Texas,
339 U.S. 707, 709 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 701 (1950).
10223 U.S. 166 (1912).
"5135 U.S. 69 (1941).
12Skiriotes v. State, 144 Fla. 220, 197 So. 736 (1940).
1315 STAT. 70 (1868).
14332 U.S. at 37.
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of Florida and in the absence of conflicting federal legislation, is
within the police power of the state.15
Immediately following the Tidelands decision some writers took
the position that continued state regulation, at least to the extent
previously permissible, would be difficult to reconcile with complete
federal dominion.16 Certainly the police power remaining to the
states had to be reestablished. Toomer v. Witsell,17 however, reaffirmed to the individual states their rights to continue the regulation
and conservation of salt water fish and shellfish. Appellants had
urged that South Carolina had no jurisdiction over coastal waters
beyond the low water mark, basing their contention, as did appellants in the instant case, on the Tidelands decision. The Court,
adopting Skiriotes v. Florida as analogous under such circumstances, denied that United States v. California precludes all
activity by the states in the marginal sea, and held that in the absence
of positive conflict between state and federal regulation the states
can continue to exercise police power functions in the area, provided
that they observe the requirements of due process and do not place
a burden on interstate commerce.
Traditional property concepts support the contention that the
pier in question, being permanently affixed to the submerged soil, is
at law a part of it; and the argument then runs that the Tidelands
decision in practical effect has vested ownership of the soil in the
Federal Governments The fact remains, however, that the Supreme
Court has not as yet so held; indeed, any such argument would establish in the Federal Government a substantial portion of Florida's
Overseas Highway to Key West. Furthermore Toomer v. Witsell 9
upheld a state tax the proceeds of which were devoted to shrimp conservation, definitely a police function. Similarly, Volusia County was
in the instant case furnishing protection under this same power. Such
protection is not furnished free to other property owners, as a rule,
and to the Supreme Court of Florida pier-owners are no exception.
The instant decision represents in all probability the attitude
that the courts of every state having an interest in the tidelands area
151d. at 38.
16Woodley, Constitutional Law-Federal Rights to Tidelands, 8 LA. L. REv. 578
(1948).
37334 U.S. 385 (1948).
IsSee United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 31 (1947).
19334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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